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Research and Policy Implications*
Louis Kriesberg
ABSTRACT
This article focuses on intractable conflicts and how they are transformed.
Specific attention is given to the kinds of questions raised by research on such
conflicts as well as the policy implications of selected research efforts.
Although we believe that in most cases reducing the intractability of
conflicts is desirable, we also recognize that often one (or more) adversary
believes that any likely settlement of its conflict would be worse than
maintaining the struggle.
Whether or not an intractable conflict is preferable to any particular set-
tlement depends upon one's values and interests. Whether the reader
believes that inhibiting the intractability of a particular conflict or class of
conflicts is desirable or that fostering intractability is preferable, policy
suggestions can be stated as if either were true. The reader can invert the
policy suggestion in accord with her or his preference.
The policy implications suggested pertain to a phase in conflict settle-
ment that is beginning to receive needed attention: prenegotiation. In the
past, most attention among analysts of conflict resolution was focused on
* Printed with permission of Syracuse University Press. This article was the last chapter in
Intractable Conflicts and Their Transformation (1989), pp. 210-220, edited by L. Kriesberg,
T. A. Northrup, and S. J. Thorson.
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negotiation and mediation in negotiations. Recently, attention has turned to
how adversaries come to the table to conduct negotiations. To maximize
the utility of research and policy suggestions, it is necessary to specify the
kinds of conflicts for which the suggestions are relevant.
Specifying Kinds of Conflicts
Throughout the discussion in this chapter, we consider what is shared by
all social conflicts and what is specific to particular kinds of conflicts. This
assumes that they form an equivalence class but requires categorizing kinds
of conflicts.
One conventional categorization of conflicts is in terms of "levels," the
size of the arena and adversaries. Thus, we commonly speak of interper-
sonal conflicts (e.g., within families), intergroup or interorganizational con-
flict (e.g., within a community or country), and international conflict (e.g.,
within world regions). Another conventional categorization is in terms of
specific issues in contention, for example, environmental policy, child cus-
tody, ethnic separatism, control over territory, or control of a state.
For purposes of research and theory building, other systems of catego-
rization are more relevant and useful than the conventional systems. No sin-
gle dimension of conflict can provide an adequate set of categories. Social
conflicts are multidimensional and so must be the categorizations. We must
take into account the characteristics of the adversaries, the social system
within which they are contending, and the issues about which they are strug-
gling. This is not the place to present the elaborate and detailed categoriza-
tion of conflicts; it is sufficient to outline relevant major dimensions.
Adversaries vary in number (Raiffa 1982). They also vary in the degree
to which they are clearly bounded and internally differentiated (Kriesberg
1982). Clearly bounded adversary units are ones with generally recognized
and publicly defined members and in which the membership in a particu-
lar adversary unit does not substantially overlap with membership in oth-
ers that are likely to be in conflict with it. For example, persons, states, and
organizations are clearly bounded compared to social classes, ethnic
groups, and supporters of different environmental policies. Units are highly
differentiated insofar as there are many specialized roles, most importantly
ones involving the conduct of conflict relations with other units. For exam-
ple, states are highly differentiated, with special bureaucracies for external
relations, including war making.
Social conflicts involving one or more adversaries who are not clearly
bounded or highly differentiated are likely to follow different patterns of
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intractability transformation than are conflicts among clearly bounded and
highly differentiated adversaries. Thus, when heads of the adversary units
have the authority to make binding decisions, shifts toward tractability can
be relatively quickly done. For example, the Israeli and Egyptian govern-
ments moved toward tractability more decisively than have the Israeli Jews
and Arab Palestinians.
The social systems within which adversaries contend vary in the degree
to which they have institutionalized rules for managing conflicts and in the
content of those rules (Wehr 1979). Conflicts are waged usually within the
context of a social system with rules for their conducts and they often take
on qualities of a game. Every society and most organizations have both for-
mal and informal rules for managing conflicts. Rules, however, are not well
developed for conflicts among states; even within a society, they do not
effectively regulate conflicts among nonlegitimate adversaries, and about
issues not considered legitimate.
The social systems also vary in the way the adversary units relate to
each other in that system. Thus, the parties may have a great deal of mutual
dependence, relatively independent of each other, or be in a relationship of
domination and subordination.
Adversary units are related to each other in a variety of ways within dif-
ferent social systems. They vary in the power they have relative to each
other, in the degree of dependency each has on the other, and in their rela-
tionship to the interpreters and implementors of the institutionalized means
of managing conflicts. For example, an ethnic conflict might be between
two ethnic groups which are both marginal in the host society or between
one ethnic group that is marginal and another that occupies the dominant
political and economic strata.
Conflicts vary significantly in the number and content of the issues that
are matters of contention (Raiffa 1982). The nominal content of the
issues—environmental damage in Alaska, the political borders of Germany,
or the custody of Mary D. and John D.'s children—is infinite: every con-
flict is unique. We need to have more abstract ways of categorizing con-
flicts to make useful generalizations possible.
One general distinction that has been made for several years is between
conflicts that are consensual and those that are dissensual (Aubert 1963). In
consensual conflicts, the adversaries agree about what is valued and differ
about the allocation of what they agree they want; this may be land or
another resource. The parties are fighting about interests. In dissensual con-
flicts, the parties differ about what is desirable, but at least one party insists
that the other adopt its vision of what is desirable; this may refer to politi-
cal ideology or religious faith. The fighting is about values they do not share.
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Another relevant distinction is between conflicts in which the adver-
saries do or do not share a common understanding of the nature of the fight
between them. In some conflicts, the antagonists do not agree about the
issues in contention; perhaps one side stresses one consensual and the other
the dissensual nature of their struggle with each other.
Finally, a difficult conceptual matter pertaining to the issues in con-
tention must be considered. Partisans and observers sometimes assert that
a particular conflict is "unrealistic" (Coser 1956). This usually means that
one or more of the adversaries is said to be mistaken about the source of
its grievance. For example, ethnic conflicts in the United States are some-
times said to be unrealistic, as when prejudice is alleged to arise from the
psychological displacement of other feelings. A social conflict is realistic
when the analyst believes that there are objective or structural conditions
which are the bases for the social conflict and that these conditions corre-
spond to the ostensible matter of contention among the adversaries.
The distinction between realistic and unrealistic conflict has two other
conventional meanings that should be recognized. One is that a conflict is
unrealistic when the goals set by an adversary are unattainable. Unrealistic
conflict occasionally refers to a conflict in which the means being used are
out of proportion or unrelated to the ostensible purposes of the adversaries.
Every actual conflict is a blend of these features. Consensual and dis-
sensual matters are both present; not all members of all adversary groups
agree about what the issues in contention are; consequently, analysts are
likely to recognize some realistic and unrealistic elements in every fight.
The utility of these dimensions about the characteristics of the adver-
saries, about the social systems in which they contend, and about the issues
of contention is indicated as we discuss needed research and policy impli-
cations.
Needed Research
The kinds of research that the analysis and discussions suggest would be
important are discussed in the following three categories: (1) the meaning
of intractability, (2) the bases and deepening of intractability, and (3) the
reduction and transformation of intractability. And in discussing needed
research, we emphasize research questions and not research design. The
designs should often include comparisons among different kinds of con-
flicts in order to assess the generalizability of any findings.
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Meaning of Intractable Conflicts
Whether or not a conflict is regarded as intractable is a matter of social
judgment based on social conventions. There are social conventions about
how long different kinds of conflicts are expected to persist, about the
expectations adversaries have concerning the possibility of a settlement,
and about what the employable limits are to the means of struggle.
Research also needs to be conducted to discover who among the adver-
saries effectively defines a conflict as intractable.
Who defines a conflict as intractable is important insofar as that charac-
terization impacts on the conflict itself. Is it likely that once a conflict is
labeled intractable intermediary efforts are reduced because they are regarded
as doomed to fail? Is it likely that the adversaries themselves tend to believe
that the struggle will not be settled for a very long time and/or must await
major external intervention, once they accept the conflict as intractable?
We should also ask how answers to such questions vary among differ-
ent kinds of conflicts. For example, we expect that conflicts that occur in
social systems with institutionalized rules for managing conflicts will be
identified as intractable in terms of their relationship to such rules, as inter-
preted by the rulemakers. Thus, fights about matters similar to ones usu-
ally processed through the judicial system, if not settled within that system,
are likely to be viewed as intractable. This may be the case for environ-
mental disputes.
We also believe that dissensual conflicts are more readily characterized
as intractable because the expectation is that no major party will change its
basic values; but adversaries are viewed as more ready to settle disputes
over matters about which they share values. Thus, the value or cultural dif-
ferences in ethnic conflicts obstruct finding mutually acceptable solutions.
Bases of Intractability and Increasing Intractability
One basis for intractable conflicts is felt threats to one's individual or
collective identity. Research is needed about the ways in which multiple
identities are related to each other and how some identifications become
salient and the grounds for an intractable conflict while others do not. One
arena in which relevant research has been done pertains to ethnic identities
and loyalty to the state, but this research has usually focused on the emer-
gence of conflict and its persistence. The transformation of such conflicts
into tractability has been relatively neglected.
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Because one of the ways identity is formed is in opposition to other
groups of people, that process needs to be better understood. Once a strug-
gle is underway, adversaries often try to define the other and impose an iden-
tification. This is exemplified by struggles to define Palestinians, Zionists,
Israelis, and Arabs. Research is needed about the way efforts to define the
enemy occur and threaten each party's self-identification. Research is also
needed about how conflicts are waged so that they do not entail such efforts
by adversaries to impose an unwanted identification on each other.
Intractability can emerge from several other bases. Once conflicts are
underway, segments of each adversary group often develop a vested inter-
est in the struggle. For the fighters, it may become a way of life. Research
is needed about such developments and about what fosters and what
inhibits them.
A long-standing idea in the social science literature is that conflicts in
which many lines of cleavage are superimposed are likely to be intense
(Dahrendorf 1959). They are also likely to be intractable. Consequently,
when ethnic lines correspond to class, religious, linguistic, and regional
differences, crosscutting ties are likely to be absent, and a mutually satis-
factory resolution difficult to construct. On the other hand, when such divi-
sions overlap and crosscut each other, particular disputes are likely to seem
manageable. We need research to assess this idea, for different kinds of
conflicts in different contexts.
Conflicts in which the outcomes sought by each side threaten the adver-
saries' basic interests are also likely to be intractable. For example, Paige
(1975) has argued that agrarian revolutions vary in accord with the basic
sources of income of the cultivators and noncultivalors. He argues that
when the cultivators earn their income from the land (as workers on a com-
mercial hacienda) and so do the noncultivators (the owners of the com-
mercial hacienda), an intense social revolution is more likely than when the
cultivators earn their income in the form of wages (as on a plantation) and
the noncultivators' income is largely from their capital investment (as in a
plantation). In the latter case, reform is more likely than revolution, and the
conflict is relatively tractable.
All these matters are likely to vary among different kinds of conflicts.
Examining any one of them comparatively, among different kinds of con-
flicts, should illuminate our understanding of each. To take one illustration,
consider the growth of identifications in a way that threatens one or more
than one of the parties in a struggle. In arenas with well-established insti-
tutionalized processes for handling conflicts among recognized parties, the
parties may be clearly identified but not threaten each other's essential
identity. This may be the case, for example, in highly regulated collective
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bargaining between trade unions and management. In arenas with less well-
established institutionalized processes, the issues in contention may be less
well bounded and even the identities less clear. For example, in the emerg-
ing environmental disputes, the parties are often still in the process of
defining themselves and trying to characterize their protagonists.
We might also ask how the development of vested interests in a struggle
differs among conflicts in which the adversaries are large, clearly bounded,
and highly differentiated, as in a struggle between unions and management,
and among ones in which the adversaries are not very large, clearly
bounded, or differentiated, as in a child custody struggle between divorcing
parents. In conflicts between large-scale adversaries, each one tends to
develop specialists in conducting the struggle who make a career of it.
Transforming Intractable Conflicts
As discussed by Hunter (1989) and Frohock (1989), one basis for
intractable conflicts is the ontological differences in the adversaries' view of
issues. Their fundamental differences make a resolution of their conflict very
difficult. Even under these circumstances, however, the adversaries may set-
tle a particular dispute, without a change in their ontologies. As Hunter
points out, an ontology does not predict an exact position on a given issue.
Research is needed on how specific settlements are reached, without
changes in ontologies. Settlements may depend on accepting the results of
institutionalized procedures, as when religious and medical ontologies
seem incompatible to particular sects and hospitals, but the courts rule on
the settlement of a particular dispute. How does this happen in less-insti-
tutionalized arenas? What are the consequences of such settlements? Do
they weaken or reinforce the ontological differences or do such settlements
leave them untouched?
Adversaries never have purely conflicting relations; they always have
some common interests and even shared identifications. We need research
on how the balance between those cooperative or complementary aspects
and the competitive or conflictual aspects shift. Presumably when the rel-
ative importance of cooperative or complementary aspects increases, a con-
flict becomes more tractable.
One matter that affects the relative significance of cooperative and of
antagonistic aspects of the relationship is the salience of other conflicts
each adversary has. When do adversaries come to regard a common enemy
as a major concern? When does one adversary come to believe that enemy
number one has become a secondary enemy? What circumstances and/or
ideas contribute to reframing a conflict so that it becomes tractable?
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In the conflict resolution literature, the intervention of a mediator is
often presumed to be an important element not only in facilitating negoti-
ations but also in initiating de-escalating negotiations. We need research
about the extent to which that is the case. Under what circumstances does
an intermediary facilitate de-escalation in an intractable conflict?
An important debate about the transformation of an intractable conflict
is between those who argue that it is a gradual process and those who argue
that it entails a rapid, fundamental shift. On one hand, the argument is that
step-by-step, piece-by-piece settlements of particular disputes enable adver-
saries to begin to trust each other enough to think constructively about
mutually acceptable outcomes (Kriesberg 1986). The conflict is then man-
ageable and can be pursued as a tractable conflict. On the other hand, it is
argued that once a conflict has become intractable, mistrust is so high that
a dramatic and fundamental shift is needed. A basic change in the nature
of the conflict and the way it is conceived by the partisans is necessary.
When basic needs are being dealt with, movement toward resolution is pos-
sible (Burton 1987). We need to examine actual cases of conflicts becom-
ing tractable to assess these different views.
In all these matters, comparisons among different kinds of conflicts
would be useful. It is clear that within systems that have highly institu-
tionalized conflict regulation, the roles of intermediaries are diverse and
specialized. In addition to conciliators, mediators, and arbitrators, they
include judges, juries, commissions, agencies, and legislative bodies. Even
for conflicts that are not conducted within a regulated context, many kinds
of intermediaries can and do provide a wide variety of conflict manage-
ment functions. These are done informally and by persons and groups who
act without explicit designation or recognition as intermediaries by the
adversaries in the conflict.
Several examples of groups performing such informal intermediary
actions include U.S. dialogue groups on the Middle East, the Greens in
West Germany, and researchers on environmental issues in Alaska.
Research is needed about the ways formal and informal intermediary
activity supplement each other and undermine each other. Analyses of alter-
native dispute resolution in conjunction with the judicial system and of Track
II (unofficial) diplomacy in conjunction with official diplomacy are begin-
ning to be undertaken (Bendahmane 1987). Comparisons between them
would be useful. In addition, studies of the varying effectiveness of experts,
intellectuals, and religious leaders mediating in conflicts that differ in the
degree to which value and interest issues are in dispute would be useful.
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Policy Implications
As previously stated, policy is discussed as if transforming an intractable
conflict to a tractable one is the goal. This need not be the case for an actor
in a particular fight, since any reasonably foreseeable settlement might be
undesirable for that person or group. Such an actor might read these pol-
icy implications as providing ideas not to be implemented but turned
around.
It is important to be explicit about the role being played by the would-
be policy maker. The policy that might be pursued by a member of one of
the adversary entities is obviously different than the policies that might be
pursued by an intermediary. Policies are also likely to be different for a
major officeholder, and opposition leader, or a rank-and-file member of one
of the adversary parties.
Policies also should be explicitly placed in a time frame. This is espe-
cially significant when we consider intractable conflicts. After all, every
fight does end, but it does matter whether this termination follows years or
even generations of sacrifice. Discussions of policy should be explicit
about the length of time in which the policy is to be implemented: days,
weeks, months, years, decades, or centuries.
We discuss policies in terms of two major phases: preventing a conflict
from becoming intractable and transforming it so that it becomes more
tractable.
For preventing conflicts from becoming intractable, the analyses pre-
sented suggest several long-range strategies. One general strategy is to
avoid creating vested interests for continuing a conflict. This means, for
example, providing options for people who otherwise would be able to do
nothing except fight or wait for the total defeat of the adversary. These
matters are especially important with large-scale adversaries, such as eth-
nic groups and their organizations. This policy could be pursued by inter-
mediaries as well as the adversaries themselves.
Another important long-range policy is to avoid threatening the essen-
tial identity of the adversary. This is a policy that is especially pertinent for
the adversaries themselves. To prevent a conflict from becoming
intractable, each adversary should not deny the fundamental claims of the
other. Finally, developing institutionalized ways of handling a particular
kind of conflict reduces the likelihood that one of those kinds of conflicts
will become intractable. This includes making settlements that embody
procedures for dealing with the recurring disputes within the context of the
major conflict, which continues beyond particular settlements.
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In transforming intractable conflicts, one strategy is particularly relevant
for the rank-and-file members of the adversary groups if they plan to
develop support for accommodation with their opponent. This is a long-
range strategy in which support for accommodation when the time is pro-
pitious is gradually developed. Such efforts may take place in various
constituencies. For example, Schwartz (1989) describes the work of dia-
logue groups in the United States in which Americans from Jewish,
Palestinian, and other communities seek common ground and try to influ-
ence their communities and the U.S. government's policies toward an
accommodation between the Israeli government and the Palestinians.
Another policy is applicable for all segments of any adversary or for an
intermediary. That is to find some areas of possible settlement and work to
attain them. This presumes that an incremental approach to the transfor-
mation of an intractable conflict is possible and perhaps even necessary.
Among the long-term policies is one in which the past and hence the
current identifications are redefined. Interpreters (intellectuals and politi-
cians) play critical roles in these redefinitions. Intellectuals and politicians
are often ideological agitators, championing opposition to oppression, or
they are justifiers of the status quo. Less often, they are articulators of rec-
onciliation and accommodation between enemies. Yet, those latter roles
are, in the long run, critical.
In the short run, intermediaries and officials of adversary parties may try
to discover de-escalating strategies. This means selecting a set of parties
who might agree on even a partial settlement, excluding those who would
not agree, but not excluding those who could effectively prevent an agree-
ment. There are dilemmas here. Excluding intransigent parties in the dis-
pute may make it possible to reach an agreement, but the agreement may
not be implemented. Furthermore, excluding any parties with a stake in the
fight makes equitable treatment for them less likely. Strategies may involve
finding a set of contentious issues, perhaps even relatively peripheral ones,
about which an incremental agreement might be reached. The strategies
may also involve a blend of inducements that is sufficiently attractive to
make an agreement possible; the inducements would entail promised ben-
efits and the avoidance of particular harms.
Finally, intermediaries can contribute in various ways to transforming
intractable conflicts. For example, they can add compensatory benefits, or
otherwise increase the size of the pie, thereby reducing the zero-sum nature
of the conflict. This is illustrated by the U.S. government's role in the 1978
Camp David meetings between Israeli and Egyptian delegations headed by
Primary Minister Begin and President Sadat.
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Many actors can serve as intermediaries and perform mediating func-
tions. They may be nongovernmental as well as governmental persons and
groups, and they may be based in one of the adversary units or based in
social locations that are not aligned with any of the primary adversaries
regarding the particular issue in dispute.
We are well aware that we have not fully answered many of the ques-
tions we have posed. We hope that by posing them and providing partial
answers, others will help answer them more comprehensively. We believe
that there is much to be learned about how intractable conflicts gradually
or suddenly become tractable. Furthermore, reflecting on such transforma-
tions should give those persons who would want to de-escalate an intense
conflict an enhanced understanding about how such transformations can be
fostered. Comparing such diverse conflicts as we have provides a test of
such efforts. We believe that such comparisons can suggest insights about
each kind of conflict. What seems obvious and necessary about a conflict
can be recognized as a social convention that could be different under
changed circumstances.
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Getting to the Table: Creating the
Forum for Negotiations in Deep-Rooted
Conflicts
James H. Laue
ABSTRACT
The first step in the conflict resolution process is establishing a forum in which
cooperative negotiation can occur among the parties. Three aspects of this
"getting to the table" process are analyzed: functional requirements for the
table or setting, methods of getting the parties there, and value choices about
the nature of the table and the process there.
True resolution of conflict—in contrast to management, settlement, win-
ning-losing or mere termination—occurs only through negotiation or some
other form of mutual problem-solving. This principle is especially relevant
wherever deep-rooted conflicts persevere, particularly where differences
are rooted in religion, race, ethnicity or other sources of group identity.
Coercion and continued violation of the basic human needs for identity and
recognition never can "resolve" deep-rooted or political conflicts (Burton
1987). A settlement imposed by one of the parties or by an outside source
will not last unless the basic needs of each party are satisfied; that can only
take place through joint analysis, relationship building, and problem-solv-
ing among the parties.
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How is it possible for parties who have sworn not to talk with one
another to get to a negotiating table? How is it possible to build an envi-
ronment for problem-solving when the other party is defined as the prob-
lem? How can a setting be created for parties who have vowed never to
compromise, to shape compromises?
This article examines the process required to build a forum (i.e., an
environment, setting, or set of conditions) to which parties are willing to
come—at least for one meeting—to examine the prospects for resolution of
their conflicts. I have developed the phrase "getting to the table" which
describes that process, with "table" as a broad metaphor for the forum
(face-to-face, shuttle, or electronic) in which negotiation and problem-solv-
ing may take place among the disputing parties.
The Problem-Solving Paradigm in Political Conflicts
"Realism" and "Problem-Solving"
The so-called "realist" paradigm in international affairs has dominated
thinking about protracted political conflicts within nations and at the
regional level as well. The goal has been security in a dangerous world of
adversaries, with the strategic focus on control, enforcement and deter-
rence. Winning is the immediate objective in any conflict.
In the last two decades, a growing group of scholars and practitioners
has shifted the focus to resolving rather than winning conflicts, with the
strategic focus on analysis, problem-solving and negotiation (Burton 1969;
Doob 1970; Kelman and Cohen 1976; Zartman 1977; Fisher and Ury 1981;
Mitchell 1981; Banks 1984; Saunders 1985a). In this framework, all of
social life is a negotiated order, and self-interest is best served by engag-
ing in negotiated problem-solving with other self-interested entities in an
uncertain but interdependent world. Sustaining and improving the relation-
ship is as important as achieving a satisfactory substantive outcome in
conflict.
The getting-to-the table problem is set in the context of the joint prob-
lem-solving approach to political and deep-rooted conflicts. It values joint
approaches over unilateral action, face-to-face interaction, viewing the
other party or parties as negotiating partners with whom an agreement is
possible (rather than as enemies or opponents to be beaten, and a focus on
good relationships as well as good substantive outcomes. These are clear
process preferences, which may not be shared by the parties. Helping the
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parties to create and own the process is always the first step in helping
them create and own satisfactory outcomes.
Political Acts and Problem-Solving Fora
Harold Saunders, former U.S. assistant secretary of state for Middle
Eastern Affairs and a key player in the negotiations which led to the Camp
David Accords in 1978, appropriately insists that negotiation in political
and policy conflicts can only be understood by placing it in the context of
the ongoing flow of political acts of the parties. Negotiation is only one
form of interaction between nations or identity groups. It does not take
place in political isolation. It often occurs informally or through "back
channels" even when the dominant mode of interaction is war or some
other mode of adversarial behavior.
The beginning of negotiations usually represents a conscious choice of
the parties to change the forum in which their dispute is being conducted—
or at least a change in their perceptions of the relative advantages and dis-
advantages of a win-lose adversarial forum for conducting their dispute.
The brokering or coercion of a third party or parties may convince them to
change the forum. Changing the forum also is a political act and has a
political impact on the nature of the ensuing process.
This stage of conflict resolution, according to Saunders, is the most
neglected element in analyses of the process. Most of the myriad frame-
works explaining the phases of negotiation and mediation begin somewhere
near the middle of the actual process with a stage such as "Define the
Problem," tacitly assuming that the parties already have been identified and
have agreed on a venue and a set of procedures for negotiating. Instead, the
first stages are what a number of authors (Saunders 1985b; Zartman 1985;
and Bendahmane and McDonald 1986, 311) have termed "pre- negotia-
tion," du Toit "bargaining about bargaining" (1989), and Laue "getting to
the table" (1986; Laue et al. 1988; see also Stein 1989; Rothman 1990;
Potapchuk et al. 1990).
Cases abound to illustrate these processes and stages—and their essen-
tial functions in the transition from war or other adversarial fora to the
negotiating table: the preparation over several years of the Carter White
House for Camp David (Carter 1985; Quandt 1986), of Costa Rican
President Oscar Arias Sanchez in convening the Central American Peace
Process (Esquipulas Dos), of U.N. Secretary General Javier Perez de
Cuellar in Afghanistan and Iran-Iraq, of U.S. Assistant Secretary of State
Chester Crocker in Namibia (Laue 1991).
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Getting to the Table: Theory, Process, and Problems
A Theory of the Forum
A forum is any structured setting in which parties may communicate
their interests to each other and conduct problem-solving behavior about
issues between them. Establishing a forum acceptable to all the parties is
the first major stage in the resolution of deep-rooted political and identity
group conflicts. The forum in conflict resolution usually involves face-to-
face interaction among the parties, but also may be conducted with the aid
of third-party shuttles ("proximity talks" in United Nations parlance) or
electronic communications technology.
The concept of forum is not new. Archimedes understood it when he
said, "Give me a piece of ground to stand on, and I will move the world."
No significant social action occurs unless the participants have the appro-
priate base from which to move. The "peace pipe" ritual among Native
Americans and the structured exchange of peace masks and other ritual
objects among many tribal peoples provided the forum for religious, polit-
ical, and other types of negotiation with the gods or other humans. The
"Samoan Circle," the Quaker meeting, the New England town meeting, the
diplomatic conference, neighborhood "mediation" in China—all are exam-
ples of fora in which negotiation and other forms of social interaction have
taken place throughout history.
Elements of the forum required for resolution of conflict include:
1. Auspices. What persons or institutions provide the necessary societal
or group approbation necessary for legitimation of the forum? Who can
convene or otherwise cause the parties to meet initially? The auspices may
be provided by elders, the church, secular community leaders, any organi-
zation or combination of organizations (the United Nations or the
Organization for African Unity, for example, or the Red Cross or the Urban
Foundation), a person with credibility—any combination of persons and or
institutions acceptable to the parties.
2. Location(s). Where will the parties meet? In one location acceptable
to all? In several settings for balance and constituency acceptance? Only
via personal messenger or electronic means instead of face-to-face? Is a
high prestige venue required—or should it be highly confidential?
Historically, parties have gotten to the stump, the kitchen table, the wood-
shed, the circle on the ground, the bench, the bar, the altar, the street, the
battlefield, the bed, the press, or the hot tub. All are appropriate fora,
depending on the perceptions and preferences of the parties (or in some
cases, as with the woodshed, the dominant party).
138 SOCIOLOGICAL PRACTICE/1992
3. Time Frame. When shall we meet? How often? With what frequency?
Over what time period? Do we set the full schedule in advance, or are meet-
ing dates determined serially or as the need is defined? Is this a conflict
clearly limited by elections, military plans, the nature of the issue, the par-
ties, the phases of the moon, or other elements outside the control of the par-
ties? Who decides often is a crucial question in the politics of scheduling.
4. Participants. Who should be at the table—the direct parties, their rep-
resentatives, second-level parties, parties-in-exile, or scholars who under-
stand the parties' positions, sympathizers, relatives, indirect parties,
constituents or observers (how many?), only those bearing political recog-
nition or other form of legitimization, or only some of the parties? Who
decides who is a "direct" party? Who decides how big the table should be?
5. Role Relationships. The formal and informal role relationships parties
bring to the table are critical in determining their interaction. Is there a
prior relationship among any of the parties? Do they wish to maintain and
enhance it? Do any of the parties have direct authority over any of the oth-
ers (a cardinal and a priest, a tribal chief and a tribal member, a boss and
an employee)? Do the parties bring different historical relationships with
the mediator or other third-party who may be involved?
6. Procedures. Often the first joint decision fashioned by the parties at
the table, the ground rules, or the procedures under which the parties will
interact may proscribe the range of behaviors and outcomes in any given
forum. Are they imposed by an authority or developed jointly by the par-
ties? How are they enforced? What is the decision rule (voting, consensus,
other)? Caucuses? Observers? Who may speak? Is there a third party?
Media? Reporting to constituencies? Gandhi said it most succinctly: means
are pregnant with ends.
7. Issues. Issues are the substance of conflicts. An issue arises when
Party A believes Party B's behavior will prevent Party A from reaching an
important goal. Two basic types of issues in conflict are those about
resources (those goods, services and symbols valued by parties as neces-
sary for survival and the conduct of appropriate social interaction—e.g.,
food, shelter, clothing, money, education, information, security, territory,
prestige, affect) and power (control over decisions about the allocation of
resources). Conflicts involving power struggles always are more protracted,
deep-rooted, and contentious than those over resources alone. The use,
maintenance, and efficacy (and often the expansion) of power are at the
heart of all political disputes.
8. Communication Medium. The media for communication among dis-
puting parties may be live (face-to-face or through a shuttling intermedi-
ary), electronic (computer conference or telephonic connection), or print
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(thought exchange of hard copy though human or computer as intermedi-
ary). Parties ask, at least tacitly: what are the advantages and disadvantages
of joint, face-to-face interaction compared to the other communication
modes? Do we want to confer recognition on the other party or parties by
being in the same room with them? Can we vary modes of communication
to suit our perceived interests? What about the role of outside media—
should our communication with them be individual, joint, through a third
party, or not at all?
9. Values. Values (conceptions of the desirable and undesirable) under-
lie every element in a given forum and all the behavior exhibited there.
Choices are made, explicitly or implicitly, about a range of questions that
present themselves as a forum is built and operated. The most important
values underlying any negotiation or joint problem-solving approach have
to do with the nature of the process and the mode of interaction between
the participants. They are examined below in "Value Choices in Building
the Forum."
Why go to the Table?
Getting to the table does not assure getting to resolution. Parties in con-
flict may seek a forum, and/or agree to take part in negotiated problem-
solving, for a wide variety of reasons. In negotiations over policy and
political issues, coming to the table may be viewed as a political act itself
(i.e., designed to enhance one's power or the potential for a better outcome
by changing the forum), and what happens at the table as an extension of
political interaction in another forum.
Why go to the table? Parties may enter into negotiation or joint
problem-solving to accomplish any one or a combination of the following
objectives:
- to stall
- to avoid reaching an agreement
- to legitimate present political or military activity
- to save face
- to gather intelligence on the other party or parties
- to test the water or float an agreement
- to uni fy the home team
- to ceremonialize
- to ratify a prearranged understanding or agreement
- to send a message
- to solve a short-term problem
- to resolve the conflict through negotiation
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Those interested in achieving resolution of conflict through direct nego-
tiations have to find ways to assure that the major focus of the at-the-table
work will be on joint problem-solving and reaching a mutually acceptable
agreement, rather than on the range of other possible objectives illustrated
above. Carefully choosing the path to the table and the specific steps along
the way can help ensure the integrity of the process once there.
Some Paths to the Table
The previous section outlined the elements of the forum for which pro-
vision must be made before parties can begin substantive negotiations. The
process of putting those elements in place is the next focus of analysis.
There are a number of paths to the table for deeply divided parties. In
each case, the process is one of building confidence in the major actors that
they can—without serious political or physical vulnerability—hold at least
one exploratory contact with the other party or parties, usually in the form
of a joint meeting. Since moving from isolation or armed conflict into
negotiation is a high-risk political decision for parties in this type of con-
flict, they cannot be expected to buy into an entire plan for negotiation;
getting them to come to an exploratory meeting for discussion of condi-
tions and ground rules for possible negotiation is enough. Their expecta-
tion in going even this far is not to be embarrassed or made vulnerable;
maximally they can predict that a change of venue and form of the disput-
ing proces may work to their advantage.
In many conflicts, such movement toward a negotiation forum develops
as part of the ongoing perceptions and calculations of the parties regarding
their goals and the means available to achieve them, and response to the
incentives and disincentives to negotiate evolving from their conflict inter-
action. While the decision to go to the table is always a political act, the
ebb and flow of the political process often is the direct cause of such a
decision. Escalation of relationships from conflict to crisis occurs only
when at least one of the parties defines the situation as a crisis, thus requir-
ing new behaviors to protect perceived interests. Often the crisis definition
moves the parties to take military or other coercive action to reassess inter-
nal functioning—or to move to deal with a long-festering conflict that can
no longer be avoided or ignored. Building a forum to negotiate a solution
and prevent further crises now appears politically realistic and imminently
logical.
The process leading to the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, negotiated
in July 1963 by American, British, and Soviet representatives, had gone
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through a fitful series of starts, stalls, and stops for several years in the late
1950s. According to Griffiths (1989),
The ultimate prenegotiation that brought about the tripartite
Moscow talks might be said to have begun with the resolution
of the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 (78).
The Cuban crisis in particular served to underline [Soviet
Premier Nikita] Kruschev's inability to achieve a breakthrough
in improving the Soviet capacity to negotiate from acknowl-
edged strength (81).
The venture to the brink in the missile crisis had surely drawn
attention to the need for greater stability in Soviet-American
relations (82).
A crisis definition (and in this case, resolution of the crisis) changed the
parties' relationships, and helped move them to the table for negotiated
problem-solving. Stein concludes that the evidence from the six cases in
her study of international negotiation "suggests that leaders have decided
to consider negotiation when they see the need for astrategy of crisis avoid-
ance or post-crisis management or when they see a conjunction of threat
and opportunity, when prenegotiation promises to reduce some of the risks
associated with negotiation, and when they anticipate benefits from the
process which are largely independent of whether or not it culminates in
agreement" (1989, 247). When politics-as-usual fails to bring parties to the
negotiating table—or directly blocks the path—there are a variety of paths
to the table which may be promoted by third parties, including at least the
following.
1. One-on-one Analysis. One person or a team may call on parties one
at a time, enlisting their aid in assessing the conflict and the prospects for
establishing a negotiating process. This approach goes directly to the basic
requirement to move parties form bi-lateral or multi-lateral ad hominem
attacks to a consideration of turning their focus away from each other to a
third focus—in this case, joint analysis of the problem and the creative task
of fashioning a table. I have found in a number of applications of this
approach that most parties quickly become interested in the analytical and
strategic questions being posed, for they are directing energy to a task on
which they have some considerable expertise.
During the interviewing and assessment stage, it is possible to accom-
plish, in the most direct way possible, the identification of elements of the
potential forum outlined earlier in this paper. Of equal importance to an
assessor cum mediator is the development of relationships with the
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stakeholders and helping serve as a medium to start moving information
among the parties—which they inevitably ask for as they discover the
assessor has had broader contact with the dispute and the other parties than
they have.
The key requirement in this approach is to gain access to the parties for
the interview. Often an academic base and a clear scholarly task which
requires the parties' assistance is enough to get in the door.
EXAMPLE: Under the auspices of the mayor and a member of the state
highway commission, my colleague Sharon Burde and I interviewed 26
persons individually between October 1985 and January 1986 in Fort Worth
about their role in and analysis of a dispute over downtown highway expan-
sion that had been brewing since 1979. Study documents, consultant
reports, lawsuits, and the operation of the traditional highway planning pro-
cess had failed to resolve the dispute. The interviewees were asked to join
us in an analysis of the issues and help build a process and agenda for res-
olution. Most interviews were one to two hours; one lasted for five hours.
The process culminated in an analysis of the dispute presented to all those
interviewed and an invitation from the mayor and the commissioner to the
seven major parties identified to attend an exploratory meeting with the
interviewers. Through a hybrid negotiations/problem-solving process that
operated under the auspices of the Conflict Clinic for three years in con-
junction with the prescribed federal, state and city planning frames, full
consensus on a plan was reached. Implementation of the plan now is under
way (Laue et al. 1988).
2. Convenor. In some situations, a powerful broker may be required.
Who has the power, the credibility and/or the relationship with the parties
to bring them to the table? This is the first and crucial question in consid-
ering the convening role. To convene the parties for the first meeting
requires that the convening person, organization or governmental jurisdic-
tion be perceived as fair and credible—or possess sufficient sanctions over
the parties to make it virtually mandatory that they come to the table. There
are at least three types of convenors:
- a convenor with the required prestige or credibility
- a convenor with coercive power over the parties
- a convenor with considerable perceived influence or access to
resources desired by some or all of the parties.
EXAMPLES: Representatives of the first type are religious leaders and
elder statespersons (e.g., Pope John Paul in the Beagle Channel dispute and
former President Jimmy Carter in the 1989-90 Ethiopian-Eritrean talks). A
coercive convenor typically appears in international disputes where a third
nation believes it is in its best interest to bring disputing nations to the
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table (Touvaal and Zartman 1985). Carter's role as convenor of the Israel-
Egypt Camp David meetings is a good example of the third type, as is the
"mediation" of President Theodore Roosevelt in the 1906 Russia-Japan
conflict. The same is true of many of the good offices efforts of the secre-
tary general of the United Nations (Afghanistan, Iran-Iraq, and Cyprus
have been mentioned), as well as President Arias' role in convening the
five Central American states in the Contadora process. U.S. Secretary of
State Henry Kissinger's "shuttle diplomacy" between Egypt and Israel in
1974 is another much-publicized example of a powerful nation serving as
a convenor—although on this occasion the forum was a moving one,
embodied in a person, rather than a single place.
3. Emissaries and Brokers. When one or more of the parties wants to
explore negotiations but fears that direct contact will weaken its positions
or signal compromise, emissaries or brokers may initiate contact and con-
duct quiet or back channel negotiations about getting to the table. An his-
torical ally, a trading partner, a friendly academic or NGO—all are typical
occupants of this role.
EXAMPLES: Quiet Quakers, with no formal power and no diplomatic
portfolio, have brokered relationships and carried pre-table messages
between parties in a wide range of international and ethnic conflicts
(Yarrow 1978). An unusual broker's role was played by CBS anchor Walter
Cronkite in the activities leading to the Camp David talks between Israel
and Egypt in 1978. When Cronkite interviewed Egyptian President Anwar
Sadat on videotape in Cairo, Sadat made his now-famous "I will go to
Jerusalem" statement. Cronkite immediately flew to Israel to interview
Prime Minister Begin, who was prepared to respond to the electronic offer.
Sadat went to Israel, addressed the Knisset, and important pre-Camp David
relational groundwork was in place for President Carter.
4. Joint Problem-Solving Workshop. The joint problem- solving work-
shop may become a path to the negotiating table when the participants are
drawn from a specific conflict with some degree of ripeness. Such work-
shops—pioneered by John Burton in London in the 1960s and Herbert
Kelman in Cambridge and the Middle East in the 1970s, provide an ideal
"third focus" for the parties: analysis, in a non-negotiating, formally apo-
litical setting, of their dispute and the development of parameters and inno-
vative ideas for dealing with it. Alternately, the substantive focus may be
another subject of joint interest to the parties, so they may practice joint
analysis and problem-solving on an issue, with the expectation that the
experience may make a similar treatment of the actual issue possible. The
problem-solving workshop embodies most of the values for building the
forum presented in the next section. Keeping the parties focused on
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analysis rather than answers, and generating options rather than negotiat-
ing solutions, are the central dynamic of this process.
EXAMPLE: Such workshops have been conducted regarding Northern
Ireland, the Arab-Israeli conflict, Cyprus, Lebanon, and a variety of other
conflicts. Because of their confidential nature (and the cardinal rule that
facilitative third parties never publicly take credit), it is hard to prove
direct links between the workshops and subsequent negotiations. Parties
and observers do agree, however, that a series of Cyprus workshops in
1966 led directly to the talks between Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash and
Greek Cypriot president-to-be Clarides in 1968 (Mitchell 1981).
5. Joint Training. Bringing potential or actual disputants together for
training in analytical, negotiation, or other skills is another major potential
path to the negotiating table. Again the emphasis is on creating a situation
in which parties can interact in a non-bargaining, non-advesarial manner.
They are not brought together to negotiate or to solve a problem per se.
Nevertheless, such a setting can provide the opportunity for exploration of
the other party's interests, for building relationships, for sensing the param-
eters of an agenda, and for some negotiating about negotiating.
EXAMPLES: Roger Fisher and John Murray report their conduct of
joint training of management and union representatives of the aluminum
industry of Canada in 1983. Costly strikes in each of the two prior contract
periods prompted management to ask for help, and the Fisher/Murray
response was to convert the request for management consultation into the
provision of joint training in negotiation skills for management and the 15
labor organizations involved. The training provided the setting in which
informal non-committing exchanges could take place, and management
credits the Harvard team with creating the atmosphere in which a mutually
satisfactory contract was reached and another strike avoided. More recently,
the Harvard Negotiation Project has used this model in working with school
districts in Michigan and Ohio, resulting in negotiated resolution of diffi-
cult disputes.
While it is too early to measure its effectiveness in getting to the table,
the Hebrew University two-month Training Seminar in Pre-Negotiation for
Diplomats ("The Art and Science of Getting to the Table") is the first
attempt to apply this approach over an extended period of time (Rothman
1990). Fifteen diplomats posted in Israel took part in the training, whose
main aim was to develop in them critical thinking about conflict and its
resolution. The participants represented a dozen different countries and
reported great satisfaction with the experience. Whether there will be trans-
fer of the skills and the relationships awaits the entry of these diplomats
directly into the major conflicts of the region.
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6. Scholarly Conference. Bringing the conflict participants (or their
close academic allies) together can provide another setting in which the
possibilities of establishing direct negotiations can be addressed. The ritual
of formal academic presentations allows parties to effect a more objective
posture while presenting their cases, and often provides a vehicle to send
messages and float ideas to other parties. These ideas could not come in a
direct diplomatic or negotiating context for fear they would sound like
offers or demands which require a response.
EXAMPLES: The South Africa case offers many illustrations, all of
which provided protected environments in which scholars and activists
(many of them later involved in the post-February 2 negotiations shaping
the country's future) exchanged papers and built relationships. The
Williamsburg Conference of April 1988 brought major players in South
Africa together and produced a report in wide circulation in policy circles.
Former U.S. Senator Dick Clark's Southern Africa Policy Forum in
Bermuda in March 1989 offered a similar setting, with some participants
consenting to be on the island only when opposition parties were not. That
conference also produced a thoughtful document addressing many major
issues now on the table in ANC/government negotiations. A number of
scholar-activists from Israel and the West Bank attended the Conference on
Conflict Resolution in south Africa, Israel, and Northern Ireland sponsored
by the Friedrich Naumann Foundation and the Institute for a Democratic
Alternative in South Africa in September 1989 in Bonn. The scholarly
norms and climate of gatherings provides active combatants the space to
try different conceptualizations and behaviors regarding their conflict—
often the first step toward willingness to negotiate.
7. Ongoing Non-Official Mechanisms. Mechanisms built for ongoing
contact of scholars, diplomats, private citizens, and policy-makers across
the lines of a major conflict cleavage can provide the setting to negotiate
toward the table.
EXAMPLE: The Dartmouth Conference—now in its 22nd year of con-
tinuous U.S.-Soviet contact and beginning similar formats with China and
some Latin American countries—is the best illustration. It is not officially
sponsored by national governments, yet it has generated a number of ini-
tiatives which have found their way into official channels and is conducted
with the blessing of the foreign ministries.
8. Other Mechanisms. There are a number of other activities that can
help create the environment and build the tracks to the table for parties
who, for face-saving or other reasons, cannot meet directly about negotia-
tion. The varieties of "Track II" or non-official citizen diplomacy have
been growing rapidly. Peace walks, naturalist expeditions and other "field
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trips" have created among adversaries an atmosphere impossible to achieve
at the formal diplomatic table. U.S. and Soviet officials have been reported
to develop close personal and working relationships through such foxhole
experiences as mountaineering and gondola rides.
The object is always the same: find a setting in which disputing parties
can meet in a politically safe environment to explore ideas, build relation-
ships, learn the other parties' interests, and either directly or indirectly dis-
cuss the conditions under which they will be willing to come to the table.
Value Considerations: What Kind of Table?
Every human activity represents a choice among competing values, how-
ever implicit or unintended. Building a forum for negotiation of deep-
rooted political or constitutional conflicts is no exception. Not just any
table will do—not, for example, a table where the power relationships are
so asymmetric that the dominant group's reasons for being present are
stalling, public relations, and/or intelligence. Any third party committed to
helping get parties to the table in rancorous international or inter-identity
conflicts should be cognizant of the value choices implied, make them
explicit to all involved, and help the parties deal with them with clear pur-
pose and intentionality.
Values are conceptions of the desirable—and the undesirable. In well-
integrated cultures and social groupings, values are so well internalized
that most actors are not aware of them nor do they make conscious choices
about them. Conflict brings values to the surface, forcing consideration and
choice. Values beget (or at least justify) norms. How shall we make deci-
sions? What are the most important goals we should pursue? Is everyone
here to be treated as an equal participant? Every social interaction operates
based on norms or rules undergirded by values. Since the nature of the
forum and the interaction therein can be a dominant influence on the range
of outcomes possible and pursued, the mandate for explicitness is espe-
cially strong.
There are at least eight major value choices that are made—explicitly or
implicitly—in building a forum for negotiation and joint problem-solving.
For each, a mode is chosen, and it in turn contributes to the nature and
direction of the process:
1. Facilitative or Adjudicative? Is the aim of the forum to promote adju-
dication of the dispute by a legitimate authority, or to facilitate, joint solu-
tion by the parties? While the answer is obvious that facilitated joint
problem-solving is the goal, often parties (and sometimes third parties)
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come to the table with the goal of imposing a solution through superior
force or influence.
2. Cooperative or Adversarial? Litigation and formal diplomacy are
inherently adversarial. The parties are seen as opponents who must win or
at least get the best of the other party in a compromise. The negotiation
forum operates within a cooperative metaphor. Without the ability to estab-
lish this mode of operation, joint problem-solving (and thus, I would argue,
real resolution and long-term political stability) are impossible.
3. Private or Public? Peace conferences, many aspects of formal diplo-
macy, summit meetings, and similar vehicles for dealing with serious polit-
ical problems generally occur in public. While it is the public's business
that is being done, often serious negotiation only can take place in private,
away from the minute-by-minute scrutiny of the constituency or the con-
stant playing to the media and the court of public opinion. While timely
and appropriately concrete public reporting to constituents and other cru-
cial entities is important, the forum is conducted predominately in private.
A major reason for the success of Camp David in contrast to media-driven
summits is the 13-day isolation imposed by the convenor.
4. Formal or Informal? A key to successful negotiation is the ability of
parties to get beyond formal positions, absolutist historical arguments
(often clung to for face-saving reasons) and ritualized oppositional behav-
ior toward one another. A good negotiation setting should promote consid-
erable informal interactions, where common interests are discovered, trust
built, and a sense of the zone of agreement developed.
5. Problem Solving, Truth Telling or Fault Finding? The preferred value
here is, of course, the goal of problem- solving. Academic or research
forums rely on finding the right answer and presenting it in a timely and
generally highly elaborate form. Truth telling is not effective as a mode of
promoting negotiated resolution of conflict. Legal approaches are driven by
the finding of fault based on precedent. Fault finding is not appropriate as
the dynamic for negotiating resolution.
6. Analytical or Political? Negotiation of a resolution in a conflict
between nations or identity groups is ultimately a political act. But to
achieve such a resolution often requires a degree of analysis that is not
common in the heat of interaction in conflict. One of the most important
contributions that can be made by a properly-constructed forum is to keep
the emphasis sufficiently on analysis so the parties can develop a joint
understanding of the problem. Most negotiation sessions start with answers
instead of questions. "Position papers" are written and presented. Demands
(i.e., pre-chosen answers) are put on the table. The focus is on trading and
giving/taking. Ultimately that may happen in any negotiation, but the
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possibility of constructing joint solutions is greatly enhanced if analysis is
made a legitimate, early, and extensive activity.
7. Facilitated or Non-Facilitated? Can the parties manage their own
process? A good problem-solving process requires attention to site(s), fre-
quency of meetings, pacing, timing, plenary/caucus/task group mix, rela-
tion to outside constituencies, developing and adhering to ground rules, and
team discipline. The parties ultimately must chose whether any negotia-
tions should be conducted without a third party or with a coercive power
who thereby already has purchased a seat at the table.
8. Inventing or Deciding? To be effective, negotiations in complex con-
flicts must devote considerable energy to creating options that can unblock
impasses and move the process forward. Typical position-based negotiation
begins with demands and moves to trading, often overlooking a whole
range of creative options. The forum should promote periods when the par-
ties clearly understand they are not required to make a decision on what is
put on the table, but may be free to invent or generate new options.
Sometimes referred to as brainstorming or the nominal group technique,
inventing periods can promote creative interaction and provide innovative
plans for consideration (see Fisher and Ury 1981). An inventing interlude
can promote constructive deciding.
Summing Up: Building The Table
Getting to the table refers to the many process and substantive require-
ments that must be met if parties are to change the forum of their con-
flicting behavior from win/lose adversarial interaction to cooperative
problem-solving. Parties in deep-rooted, protracted conflicts are willing to
enter into negotiated problem-solving only if they perceive sufficient incen-
tives in turning from adversarial to cooperative methods. Such incentives
often are the result of the ongoing political interaction between the parties,
in which both come to see some form of negotiation or other joint pro-
cesses as more timely, less costly, or otherwise superior to war or other
forms of physical or economic coercion. Third-party intervenors have
available to them a wide range of approaches to induce parties to come to
the table when their ongoing interaction prevents or simply does not pro-
vide adequate incentives. These approaches are referred to in this analysis
as paths to the table, and they include, most prominently, one-on-one anal-
ysis, joint training, the use of emissaries or brokers, and track II interac-
tion. Negotiating about negotiating can be as complex as substantive
negotiations, with the attention necessarily directed to putting in place
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mutually acceptable auspices, location(s), procedures, time frame, level of
publicity, etc. If cooperative problem-solving is to take place, the table to
which the parties come must be undergirded by certain values: cooperation,
a problem-solving orientation, informality, analysis rather than politics, and
a willingness to invent options rather than be mired constantly in positional
bargaining.
Putting these elements and values in place by whatever path is only the
first step toward cooperative problem-solving. But no other steps are pos-
sible until the table is built.
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Mediating Political and Social Conflicts:
The Skokie-Nazi Dispute *
Richard A. Salem**
ABSTRACT
In 1978, a mediation team from the Community Relations Service [CRS] of the
United States Department of Justice attempted to mediate the dispute between
residents of Skokie, the predominantly Jewish suburb of Chicago and the Nazi
party members of the National Socialists Party of America. This dispute in-
volved a number of issues of legal and legislative significance. After a series of
complicated negotiations, the Nazis canceled the Skokie demonstration.
The Community Relations Service (CRS) of the United States
Department of justice was established under the Civil Rights Act of 1964
to provide assistance to communities and community residents in resolving
disputes, disagreements, or difficulties relating to discriminatory practices
based on race, color, or national origin. The CRS was mandated by
Congress to offer its services whenever in its judgment peaceful relations
among the citizens of the community involved are threatened.
* Printed with permission of Jossey-Bass Inc. Publishers. This article originally appeared in
Mediation Quarterly, 5, (1984), 65-75.
** The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent
those of the Community Relations Service or the United States Department of Justice.
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The main tool used by CRS mediators and conciliators is persuasion.
They lack enforcement authority, they are precluded by law from investi-
gating, and they are governed by a confidentiality clause that makes it a
federal offense to reveal information shared with them in confidence. These
prohibitions make it easier for CRS personnel to gain the trust of parties to
a dispute, trust that often is imperative in helping to bring about peaceful
settlements.
In February 1978, a mediation team from the CRS entered the Skokie-
Nazi dispute. Its initial objective was to gain acceptance as an impartial
outside party and provide conciliation and technical assistance services that
would reduce tension and the likelihood of violence when a small band of
Nazis exercised their right to demonstrate there on June 25, 1978. But,
when it became apparent in May 1978 that the Nazi demonstration in the
predominantly Jewish Chicago suburb would lead to life-threatening con-
frontations and massive property damage, we expanded our role to include
mediation that might lead to cancellation of the planned demonstration. The
CRS normally attempts to move the disputants into a negotiating stance so
that a settlement can be worked out by the parties. But, in the Skokie case
we knew that for both moral and political reasons, none of the other par-
ties would engage in negotiations with the Nazis. That role would fall to
the CRS. This article reports on our efforts to persuade the Nazis to exam-
ine all the options available to them, including voluntary withdrawal. Our
endeavor had the full support of all the parties involved, although to this
day most would not acknowledge that they had actively encouraged the
mediation process.
Although the possibility of mediation arose when we first intervened in
the Skokie case, we viewed it as unlikely for several reasons. First, expe-
rience had taught us that it is generally counterproductive to enter into any
type of negotiations with extremists, since their objective is conflict, not to
produce resolution. Second, we rarely asked any group to consider aban-
doning its right to conduct a lawful demonstration, even when a physical
confrontation seemed inevitable, especially in a case where obtaining a per-
mit to demonstrate was a central issue to the dispute. Such an action by the
CRS could be misinterpreted as the very antithesis of the Civil Rights Act
under which it works. Thus, we originally anticipated that our only meet-
ing with the Nazis would be brief, in the presence of their attorney, just
before the June 25 demonstration. In that way, they would recognize us in
Skokie if there was a need to communicate during their demonstration.
CRS personnel would be the only persons present who had met previously
with all parties.
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The National Socialist Party.of America, led by Frank Collin, was a
splinter group composed at the height of its strength by no more than
twenty-five men of varying ages. While their rhetoric was venomous, it
was difficult to view Nazi party members as a serious threat to the security
of the community. Normally, the Nazis were at home in Marquette Park, a
white ethnic neighborhood on Chicago's southwest side where many resi-
dents feared the entry of black families into their community. Many wanted
the Nazis out of the neighborhood, but some felt that the Nazi rhetoric, as
well as the storefront headquarters across the street from the park, dis-
couraged blacks from moving in. Nazi rallies in the park had been peace-
ful and well received, mostly by younger, beer-drinking members of the
crowds that flocked there on warm spring and summer days. But, violence
that occurred when the Nazi band tested the waters outside the Marquette
Park neighborhood twice in the mid-1970s or when venturesome black
organizations attempted to march into the area led the Chicago Park District
in 1976 effectively to ban the Nazis from Marquette and most other city
parks through a prohibitive insurance bonding requirement.
The park district initially set the bond at $100,000 for coverage against
personal liability suits and $50,000 for property damage. A federal judge
ruled these sums to be prohibitive, and the park district lowered the figures
to $50,000 personal liability and $10,000 property damage. But, even that,
the Nazis contended, was both beyond their reach and a violation of their
First Amendment rights. Collin's first response to the ban was to announce
in early 1977 his intention to move his demonstrations from Chicago and
the far south suburbs, where he had found some blue-collar support, to the
northern suburbs, which, according to a leaflet prepared by his group, was
heavily populated by the "real enemy—the Jews." The leaflet continued,
"Where one finds the most Jews one also finds the most Jew haters." He
proposed taking his group to several communities, including the village of
Skokie, where an estimated 10 percent of the 70,000 residents were con-
centration camp survivors.
Skokie residents responded in anger, and the village council adopted
three ordinances. One prohibited demonstrations by political parties wear-
ing military-style uniforms repugnant to the tradition of civilian control of
government and to local standards of morality and decency. Another
banned distribution of material inciting hatred against race or ethnic groups.
The third established a substantial insurance bond requirement.
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), which had challenged the
Chicago Park District many times over the years and which was engaged
in a running battle with the district over freedom of speech in Chicago
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parks, had accepted the Nazis as a client in the insurance bond case. It
agreed to represent them in the Skokie matter as well.
As the Skokie ordinances began to run into trouble in the courts, two
bills were introduced in the state legislature that would ban Nazi demon-
strations anywhere in Illinois. One prohibited parades by quasi-military
hate groups. The other created a new crime of criminal group defamation
and gave local officials the right to seek injunctions to stop derogatory
demonstrations and the distribution of hate literature.
While battles were being fought in the courts and the legislature, another
front was opened in the media. The story received worldwide publicity and
extensive coverage both on the news and editorial pages of the Chicago
press, especially the Chicago Sun-Times, which regularly featured articles
about the issue on its front page, and on television. Into late spring, each
week brought several announcements that outside groups were coming to
Skokie to confront the Nazis. The Los Angeles Times reported that one
travel agent had booked air passage from Los Angeles to Skokie for 2,000
people. A rabbi in Lawrence, New York, announced that his group would
converge on Skokie by air and by land at a cost of $50 a person round trip
by bus, $140 by air. The Jewish Defense League (JDL) promised 134 buses
carrying 1,800 from the New York area. JDL ran an ad in a Jewish news-
paper advising those who couldn't join them that $50 would send a Jew to
Skokie. A group called Vermonters Concerned was chartering a bus from
Burlington. A leader of the Jewish War Veterans from Allentown,
Pennsylvania, promised to deliver up to 10,000 members of his organiza-
tion. More than 300 were scheduled to come from Phoenix, where a former
JDL leader announced that there would be no march in Skokie. "We will
break their legs if we have to." Earlier, JDL's national director had assured
a press conference in Skokie that there would be violence—"blood on the
streets."
These reports did not go unnoticed by the Nazi band. A newspaper
columnist reported in late May that Collin's followers were wavering. Was
it true? The CRS was asked in a confidential phone call by a Skokie vil-
lage official. He recalled that we had mentioned the possibility of media-
tion in our initial meeting. He asked whether we planned to meet with the
Nazis. We told him that we did. By then, it had become apparent that the
official estimate of 50,000 peaceful counterdemonstrators might be realis-
tic. Some two years earlier, Skokie streets were impassable for hours when
just 3,000 people showed up at a local high school to hear presidential can-
didate Jimmy Carter.
The CRS had been working closely with Jewish leaders in Skokie who
were planning a counterdemonstration and with state and local officials,
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including police, to minimize the likelihood of a confrontation on June 25.
One Skokie civic leader, a concentration camp survivor who had emerged
as a powerful spokesman for the Jewish community, proposed to a planning
committee of the Metropolitan Chicago Jewish Federation that counter-
demonstrators should confront the Nazis face to face. Others prepared a
quiet, symbolic response. But, the thought of uniforms and swastikas
aroused anguished memories and emotions that ruled out anything but a
direct and highly visible counterdemonstration.
The planners, headed by Eugene Dubow, regional director of the
American Jewish Committee, agreed on a compromise first proposed by the
CRS. They would conduct their large rally some distance from the site of
the Nazi demonstration, but a representative leadership group would "con-
front" the Nazis with a silent vigil. Later, we brought Dubow together with
Chicago's deputy police superintendent James Riordan in the CRS office to
discuss strategies. Riordan was known for his effectiveness in dealing with
street confrontations. With his superintendent's approval, Riordan agreed to
be on call to work behind the scenes with Skokie police if asked. State offi-
cials had agreed to commit up to 1,000 state troopers and national guards-
men and extensive equipment to supplement several hundred local police
from Skokie and neighboring communities.
Despite the extensive planning, nobody believed that tens of thousands
of emotional counterdemonstrators could be restrained, especially if hun-
dreds of JDL members were on hand to arouse the crowd. Some predicted
that the Nazis would be too frightened to appear and that they would can-
cel at the last minute. But, by then it might take only a rumor that the Nazis
had crossed the village line to stampede the crowd. Deputy superintendent
Riordan told the CRS that he saw no way the peace could be preserved.
This position was shared by village officials and community leaders, and it
was reflected in newspaper columns and editorials.
We knew that the decision to sit down at the table with the Nazis would
cause a number of moral and ethical questions to be asked of the CRS. Was
it proper to negotiate with a group that espoused a Nazi philosophy? Was it
legitimate to trade off Skokie for an alternative site? Can mediators main-
tain impartiality when dealing with such a group? The questions seemed
more theoretical than actual when they arose. Collin's real power, we felt,
was his ability to create emotional distress and violence in Skokie. We gave
credibility to the media report that Collin's supporters were wavering, and
we sensed that he needed a face-saving way out. Helping to find that way
was the only course we could consider in light of the risks of not doing so.
There were also some operating problems for the mediators. For one
thing, none of the other parties would go to the table. Negotiating with
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Nazis was taboo. For some, it was a moral issue. For others, the political
stakes were too high. But, none would go on record in favor of a settle-
ment. This meant there could be no signed agreement, the traditional hall-
mark of successful mediation. Whose word, then, could we trust? How
could we be sure that the parties would abide by any agreement that was
reached? In the case of the Nazis, we would rely on their attorney to hold
them accountable. This, we assumed, he could do; they would have diffi-
culty finding new counsel. With politicians and public officials, we would
take our chances.
But, there was the other side of the coin. Would the parties trust the
CRS, especially the ACLU? Our civil rights mandate notwithstanding, the
ACLU had not always viewed the CRS as an ally. It was a Department of
justice agency, which was enough for some civil libertarians to rule us out.
In addition, we avoided making advocacy statements. We sought to bring
about positive change through the process of negotiations. We could not
publicly advocate change without impeding our effectiveness as a change
agent. In this case, we made the assumption that any credibility gap
between the CRS and the parties would be more than compensated for by
the common goal of all the players=preventing physical violence in Skokie.
We were wrestling with a strategy for mediation when on May 23 Collin
issued a press release that showed us the way. Citing a federal appeals
court ruling of the previous day that upheld the Nazis' right to demonstrate
in Skokie, Collin declared he would be there unless three demands were
met: First, Skokie must repeal its restrictive ordinances; second, the state
must withdraw its proposed anti-Nazi legislation; third, the Chicago Park
District must abolish its restrictive insurance requirement. Calling his
demands reasonable, lawful, and irreversible, Collin pledged to go to
Skokie without violence, but he said that they would fight back if they
were physically attacked.
The response by public officials was not surprising. Their statements
were politically sound but they did not reflect the pressure that the officials
must have felt as the date of the scheduled demonstration grew closer.
Skokie Mayor Albert Smith said he wouldn't ask the Park District to yield.
Two state senators, sponsors of anti-Nazi bills, adamantly refused to deal
with Collin. Finally, the Park District's public information officer said that
the district had not heard from Collin.
At our request, the Chicago Park District information officer came to the
CRS office to brief us on the park district's position. He held out no hope
for lifting the insurance requirement. He pointed out that there were four
other parks in the city where the Nazis could demonstrate without a per-
mit, including Lincoln Park, which, he said would give the Nazis "good
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exposure." However, the park district would not allow Collin and his fol-
lowers to demonstrate in Marquette Park unless it was ordered by the court
to do so.
But a court decision appeared to be months away, and we needed a solu-
tion within a matter of weeks, so we met with an influential planner of the
counterdemonstrations to seek help from the Jewish leadership. We asked
whether there was someone among the shakers and makers in the Jewish
community who would use clout with the mayor and the head of the Park
District. The answer was a clear and irrevocable no. It appeared that the
matter had already been considered. Nobody in the Jewish leadership
would be involved in making a deal with the Nazis, we were told.
The next and obvious step was to meet with Collin. We cleared the
meeting with his ACLU counsel. There were three ground rules: We would
make no misrepresentations, we would do nothing to interfere with the
progress of the legal cases or Collin's civil rights, and no one would
mention the meeting to the press unless all parties concurred. Thus, on June
1, CRS conciliation specialist Werner Patterson and I met with Collin and
his counsel. One day earlier, in response to a U.S. Supreme Court ruling,
Skokie officials had issued a permit to Collin and said that a permit for a
counterdemonstration would be forthcoming. In another development, the
ACLU had initiated court action to force the park district to issue a permit
for July 9 in Marquette Park.
We opened the meeting with Collin by expressing our concern about the
ability of police to maintain order and protect Collin and his followers on
June 25. Despite the planned presence of more than 1,000 state and local
police, we said, it was questionable whether anybody could control the tens
of thousands of counterdemonstrators. Collin said that he did not want vio-
lence, and if it occurred it would not be his fault. He said that he wasn't
interested in going to Skokie but that he had to prove his First Amendment
rights. It was a matter of principle. He would rather be in Marquette Park.
We suggested that his victories in court meant that it was just a matter of
time until his First Amendment rights were sustained. Everybody, it
seemed, expected him to win the Marquette Park case. Why not postpone
Skokie until the Chicago Park District case was resolved? He declined.
With victory virtually in hand, we asked, why was Collin holding out
for all three of his demands? Would he consider less than all of them? He
said that he might, and we said that we would be back in touch within a
day or two.
Telephone calls to determine the status of the proposed state legislation
revealed that, while the anti-Nazi bills had cleared the senate, they were on
shaky ground in the house. But, they might pass the house if it appeared
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that the Nazis were going to Skokie. If the demonstration was called off,
we were assured that there would be no support for the bills. There was
considerable sentiment in the State Capitol that the bills were bad legisla-
tion-a political necessity for legislators with a Jewish constituency, per-
haps, but bad legislation nonetheless.
We had been surprised by Collin's willingness at our first meeting to
consider a compromise, so we decided to press harder at a second meeting
on June 2. At that meeting, we proposed to Collin that he allow the CRS
to announce that, since he already had his Skokie permit and since it was
a matter of time until he prevailed in Marquette Park, he had decided that
his First Amendment rights were being upheld and that he was cancelling
the Skokie demonstration. This would assure defeat of the bills in the state
legislature. Two of Collin's demands would thereby be met, and he would
have made his point without having to go to Skokie. We suggested that
Collin's group demonstrate elsewhere on June 25 while waiting for court
access to Marquette Park. Four city parks were available without a permit.
But Marquette Park was where Collin wanted to be, and he agreed only to
consider the proposition that I had made.
On June 4, I was summoned to a meeting at the home of a legislative
leader who had learned of our quiet mediation effort from a legislator we
had consulted on the Skokie bills. The leader said that the bills would be
heard in committee in a matter of days. Unless there was some sign that
Collin was backing out of the Skokie demonstration, it appeared that the
bills would pass. Emphasizing that no deals were possible, the leader
pointed out that the bills would keep the Nazis from demonstrating any-
where in Illinois until all the court challenges were over.
We sensed that these words were a bluff. There would have been other
indications in our earlier discussion with legislators or in the media if the
bills were close to passage. Despite a strong sentiment in the legislature
against the Nazis, there were equally strong concerns that the proposed leg-
islation was unconstitutional and that it would do nothing more than buy
time. The meeting suggested to us that the bills might actually be in seri-
ous trouble and that legislative leaders with strong Jewish constituencies
were feeling the pressure. They in turn wanted to put more pressure on
Collin. Being precluded from dealing with him directly, they chose the
obvious conduit. We played our role and took their message back to Collin.
The possibility of a full summer without demonstrations concerned
Collin when we discussed it with him the following day. He had already
considered it but wasn't ready to act. However, he agreed to our suggestion
that the CRS should float a story in the media saying that, in our view, there
was a distinct possibility that an alternative to Skokie would be found. The
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Chicago Sun-Times ran such a story on June 9, and the wire services quickly
spread it throughout the state and across the country. We went to the media
for three reasons: First, the story might influence action on the anti-Nazi
bills in the legislature. Second, it might help to slow down the flow of out-
of-state counterdemonstrators who were planning to move on Skokie. Third
and most important, we hoped it would change the dynamics either within
the Nazi group or between them and the other parties and thereby help to
make something happen. We weren't certain whether Collin would ulti-
mately agree to cancel Skokie, but we sensed that cancellation was within
reach, because we felt that nobody really wanted the demonstration to hap-
pen. But, we didn't know how this end was to be achieved. We certainly
didn't feel in control of the situation—something a mediator never wants to
acknowledge—and we were careful not to acknowledge it.
The anti-Nazi bills died in committee on June 12. With two of his three
demands in hand, what would Collin do? Unfortunately, he was not available
to discuss the matter. He had departed on a trip east to round up support
for his demonstration, and the answer would have to wait on his return.
Before he left, Collin had written a letter to the General Services
Administration (GSA) declaring that on Saturday, June 24, one day before
the scheduled Skokie demonstration, the Nazis would conduct a rally at the
Federal Plaza in downtown Chicago. The Federal Plaza was a favorite rally
place for all manner of organizations, in part because no permit was
required. The ACLU had established that right in court for an earlier client.
ACLU's executive director, David Hamlin (1981), has credited the CRS
with first proposing the Federal Plaza alternative. While the CRS initiated
a general discussion of alternatives with Collin, the one that he chose came
from elsewhere. The CRS was advised in confidence in mid June that a let-
ter would soon be mailed to the GSA administrator. Our only role at that
point was to provide the caller with the administrator's name and address.
We advised the GSA to be on the lookout for the letter, and once it was
received we arranged for the U.S. Attorney to convene a meeting with
local and federal law enforcement officials, Collin, and his counsel to set
ground rules for June 24.
Nothing was to come easily in this case. GSA officials in Chicago
advised us that their top Washington administrator was incensed when he
learned of Collin's plan and was considering imposing a ban that would
keep the Nazis out of Federal Plaza. Surely he was acting on his own. Was
he under the impression that a ban would be looked upon favorably by the
Jewish community? We responded with three phone calls. First, we asked
the director of the CRS to try to reach the GSA administrator and explain
the need for the Federal Plaza alternative, which he did. Next, we spoke to
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a leader in the Jewish community and suggested that, if he agreed on the
value of the Federal Plaza alternative, he might want to generate some calls
to the GSA administrator. Finally, we asked the GSA general counsel in
Washington to review the law and consider the ramifications of the pro-
posed action. We heard of no further effort to block the Federal Plaza rally.
This was the situation on June 13: The Nazis planned to hold
two demonstrations, one at the Federal Plaza in downtown Chicago on
June 24 and one in Skokie on the following day. Their attorneys were in
court seeking to force the Chicago Park District to grant them a permit for
Marquette Park on July 9. A hearing on that matter had been scheduled for
June 20. While lower court actions had convinced most observers that the
Nazis would ultimately win their way back into Marquette Park, it was by
no means clear whether they would get there by July 9. Collin was trav-
eling somewhere in the East. A demonstration in Skokie still appeared to
be likely.
We decided to approach the Chicago Park District once again on June
14. The previous day, park district superintendent Edmund Kelly had told
the Chicago Sun-Times that he would not yield on the insurance require-
ment. Skokie and Marquette Park were unrelated, he said, and the Chicago
Park District would make no special effort to let the Nazis demonstrate on
July 9. The same article noted that the Jewish community's estimate of
50,000 peaceful demonstrators did not include 12,000 demonstrators
recruited by the Jewish Defense League, which had vowed to stop the Nazi
rally with violence if necessary. We assumed that Kelly must have been
feeling some pressure and decided to approach him. However, his informa-
tion officer referred us to the attorney who was handling the Federal Court
case for the park district.
The attorney responded promptly to our call of June 14. We asked if we
could come by to see him, but he preferred to meet in our office and was
there within an hour. Before getting to the purpose of the meeting, we
engaged in the small talk that typically occurs at the outset of important
meetings. I commented on the pros and cons of mediating community dis-
putes when lawyers were involved. One of the problems, I said, was the
question of lawyers' fees, which sometimes made a settlement more diffi-
cult. Fees and damages, he responded. He had run into the problem, too. I
didn't relate his comment to the Nazi dispute and thought the point had
been dropped.
Our discussion then turned to the Nazis. The attorney saw no way to
waive the insurance requirement. The Nazis claimed that they could not
afford the bond, he said, yet they refused to reveal their finances to
the park district. For the park district to waive the insurance requirement,
the Nazis would have to show that they were destitute. He said that he was
MEDIATING POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CONFLICTS 161
going to court to prevent the July 9 demonstration. There were four parks
where no permit was required, he noted. I pointed out that Collin wanted
Marquette Park.
The only way the Nazis could have Marquette Park, the attorney said,
was by applying for seventy-four people or fewer. But, the Nazis always
applied for a hundred or five hundred or a thousand. Collin would not
admit, the attorney said, that he could not find seventy-five followers.
However, if Collin would use the rule of seventy-four, as it was called, he
did not need a permit even for Marquette Park, but merely had to give the
park supervisor a few days notice. The attorney added that Collin and his
attorney were aware of the rule, which had come up in court repeatedly.
The rule of seventy-four had never come up in CRS conversations with
Collin or his attorney. If it offered a possible alternative, I wondered why
they had never mentioned it. As the discussion wound down, I stared at my
notes. I was not certain of our positions at that moment. Was there nothing
new to explore? Had we exhausted the options? The park district attorney
leaned forward in his chair and asked me what I thought. The answer, I
said, seemed to be in my notes. "Good," he replied, adding on his way out
that he did not want any claims against the park district for damages if the
rule of seventy-four was invoked, and he did not want to litigate fees for
the ACLU attorneys. I prefer to credit the success of that meeting to intel-
ligent persistence, not to luck.
I called the ACLU attorney. I asked, Why couldn't Collin use the rule
of seventy-four? and added that I had just met with the park district's attor-
ney and that I had a proposal to discuss. The ACLU attorney told me that
damages and fees would be no problem, but there was a problem with the
rule of seventy-four: The audience and the onlookers were always counted.
I proposed limiting the count to Collin and his supporters. The ACLU
lawyer did not know whether Collin would agree, but he suggested that I
present the proposal in writing and give assurances that spectators of their
own free will would not be counted as part of the seventy-five.
I called the park district attorney to ask for details on the rule of seventy-
four. The code specified that permits were not required for public gather-
ings, ceremonies, or assemblies of less than seventy-five. I asked whether
bystanders were included. The park district attorney said that they were not
but that the district construed bystander quite literally. The crowd would
not be counted if Collin and his followers did not post notices or leaflet the
community. If the CRS were to draft an agreement on those terms, the park
district attorney said that he would stand behind it.
Trust levels were always low, and emotions ran high between the ACLU
and its persistent adversary, the Chicago Park District. Bringing them
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together to work out their differences would be too risky. We continued our
dialogue with both sides the following day.
On the morning of June 16, we learned from a newspaper reporter that
a clear-cut split over Skokie had developed at Nazi headquarters in Collin's
absence. A press conference had been scheduled for that evening, just
around the time when Collin was due back from his East Coast recruiting
trip.
We had to act quickly. There had been some progress in our talks with
the park district attorney. I phoned him and said we needed an agreement
that day. Because a large turnout would be inevitable on July 9, we pro-
posed that the park district agree not to count the crowd on that day only.
I argued that it would not matter whether Collin leafletted the neighbor-
hood. There would be a large crowd in any case, and it would be impossi-
ble to determine how many had been attracted by the leaflets and how
many by the media. He agreed. That afternoon I brought him a draft letter
from the CRS covering our understanding. He made some minor revisions,
initialed the margin, and handed it back to me with a smile: "Here's your
evidence," he said, "just in case it ever comes up." I asked whether a copy
of the letter should be sent to the park district superintendent and the public
information officer. The attorney said that it wouldn't be necessary. The
attorney always acted as though he had full authority to speak for his client.
A companion letter from the CRS was prepared for Collin and shared
with his attorney. Both letters were signed and hand delivered by 5:00 P.M.
on June 16. The man who accepted delivery at the Nazi headquarters was
told that the letter should be opened in Collin's absence. We confirmed by
a phone call an hour later that the letter had been received and read. Collin
was still away when the Nazis started their press conference. Waving the
CRS letter before the cameras, they announced that they had gained access
to Marquette Park. However, since the access was limited, they were
inclined to reject the offer.
Collin arrived just after the press conference ended. A reporter asked him
whether he was going to Skokie. Collin said that he was, and added that he
was not interested in a one-shot arrangement to go to Marquette Park.
The CRS was not represented at the press conference, but I learned from
a reporter what had transpired. I telephoned Nazi headquarters and reached
Collin at 10:30 P.M., just after the television news, and asked whether he
had had a chance to read my letter. He replied that he had and that the let-
ter was good. I asked him if he still needed to go to Skokie. He said that
he wanted to think about it over the weekend.
A reporter called me late Friday night to say that the Chicago Park
District's public information officer was denying that a deal had been
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offered. For the record, we delivered copies of the two letters to the key
newspapers and radio stations the next day.
Collin did not respond after the weekend. On Tuesday, June 20, U.S.
District Judge George Leighton ruled that the insurance requirement was
unreasonable. He ordered the Chicago Park District to give the Nazis a per-
mit to demonstrate in Marquette Park on July 9. The following day, Collin
announced that he had cancelled his Skokie demonstration and that for the
time being he would limit his demonstrations to Marquette Park and the
Federal Plaza.
REFERENCE
Hamlin, D. (1981). The Nazi-Skokie conflict: A civil liberties battle. Boston: Beacon Press.
MOVE/Philadelphia Bombing:
A Conflict Resolution History*
Paul Wahrhaftig
Hizkias Assefa
ABSTRACT
In 1985 police bombed the Philadelphia headquarters occupied by members of
the black counterculture group MOVE. What began 15 years earlier as a neigh-
borhood squabble provoked by conflicting lifestyles ended in the destruction of
sixty-one homes and the death of eleven residents—five of them children. Some
250 people were left homeless. The authors examine the dynamics of the con-
flict, analyzing attempts at third-party mediation and the possibility of resolu-
tion without violence. Interventions raised ethical issues, and there were failures
to define and involve appropriate parties, break down mutual misperceptions,
oversee implementation of an agreement, and understand the decision-making
structure of the groups involved. All these contributed to the failure of third
party intervention and may have accelerated the violence.
Father Paul Washington recalls seeing Philadelphia Mayor Wilson
Goode in church in April 1985. The mayor told him he was going to have
to do something about the radical, back-to-nature group, MOVE. "I am
going to have to move very carefully and cautiously, because we want to
*Printed with permission of Conflict Resolution Center International, Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania. This article was adapted from "MOVE/Philadelphia Bombing: A Conflict
Resolution History" (July 1986). Conflict Resolution Notes Vol. 4, No. 1, 2-9.
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avoid making any of the mistakes that were made back there in 1978." A
month later, on May 13, 1985, an assault on MOVE'S Osage Avenue head-
quarters began. Police shot 10,000 rounds of ammunition in ninety minutes
and finally dropped a bomb from a helicopter incinerating five MOVE
members and six children, and destroying sixty-one homes.
"Back there in 1978," a long brewing series of conflicts with MOVE
erupted in a shoot-out with police in which one policeman was killed. What
"mistakes" was Mayor Goode trying to avoid? What lessons can conflict
resolvers learn from these confrontations?
To answer these questions, the Conflict Resolution Center International
undertook a major research project. The Center interviewed people who
had tried to intervene in the MOVE conflicts between the early 1970s and
1985. All agreed that to understand the 1985 disaster, one must first study
the 1978 Shootout.
MOVE
MOVE began in the early 1970s as a non-violent, predominantly black,
counterculture activist group. It originally called itself "the Movement,"
later shortened to MOVE. Its founder, John Africa, was the philosophical
leader. He advocated an anti-technology approach, respect for animal life
and communal living. Its members took on the surname "Africa" to express
their sense of communal family. MOVE is often labeled as an urban, back-
to-nature, primitivist group.
In the mid-1970s, MOVE established a headquarters in Powelton
Village, an integrated, new left, section of Philadelphia. There they dis-
rupted community meetings with lengthy harangues based on the teachings
of John Africa. Their primitivism included recycling garbage by throwing
it in their yard; respect for animal life included rats and stray dogs,. They
constantly used profanities and aggressive, confrontational language. These
traits sparked a major lifestyle conflict with the neighborhood.
Police abuse became MOVE'S major political issue. In the politically
charged, post-Viet Nam 1970s, led by the tough "law and order" oriented
Mayor Frank Rizzo, the Philadelphia police were frequently accused of
racism and brutality. MOVE concentrated on protesting police abuse, and
the police in turn focused their attention on MOVE. This led to clashes,
court hearings, protests in courtrooms, contempt citations and more clashes.
A pivotal event was an April 1976 clash between MOVE and police in
which three MOVE leaders were convicted and imprisoned. They referred
to them as "political prisoners," and their release from prison became
MOVE'S main concern.
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Stages of Conflict
The 1978 Powelton conflict consisted of four phases.
Phase I involved ongoing clashes with the police, neighbors, and the
courts.
Phase II involved a heavy police presence at MOVE headquarters. Police
established a twenty-four hour presence to arrest MOVE members if
they left their headquarters.
Phase III was an attempt to evict MOVE from its headquarters by
blockading it, to "starve them out."
Phase IV was an attempt to evict MOVE using armed force—the
Shootout.
The Parties and Issues
Most of the interveners interviewed stated that the parties to the 1978
confrontation were MOVE and the City. In fact, the parties were much
more complex. One set was MOVE and the Powelton neighborhood. The
neighborhood, in turn, m was divided in its response. Some advocated
police intervention while others insisted the problem should be settled in
the community. A third faction sought to reconcile the first two.
MOVE's conflict with the city involved many sub-parties. To MOVE,
Mayor Rizzo represented the law-and-order rule they opposed, and the
police department was continually in confrontation with the activist group.
The department itself was split between the highly professional, trained,
civil disturbances squad and the rank-and-file police who were often called
"Rizzo's thugs." As confrontations with the rank and file evolved, MOVE
came into confrontation with the courts. It used them as a vehicle to dra-
matize its beliefs and issues. MOVE's fundamental issue involved the city
and courts, and more specifically, freedom for its three "political prisoners."
Merger of Issues
In Phase I these issues initially moved on separate tracks. For instance,
there were negotiations between MOVE and its neighbors. However, in
May 1977, MOVE, in responce to another law enforcement incident, dra-
matically appeared on the porch of their barricaded headquarters wearing
military uniforms and carrying weapons. Alarmed, residents called the
police, who responded by laying siege to the house. After a tense initial
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confrontation, the city vowed to maintain a massive police presence and
arrest any MOVE member who left the headquarters. They would mainly
be charged with firearm violations and incitement to riot. These pending
charges became another major issue in the negotiations.
Phase II
Bringing in the police, already a party to the conflict, as a third-party
intervener transformed the conflict and issues. The issue of police presence
outweighed all others. Rather than focus on their conflict with MOVE, the
neighbors argued with each other over whether the police presence was
appropriate. A major faction of the new left neighborhood generally
opposed police intervention. To disengage the police, this group became
involved as third-party intervenor in MOVE'S conflict with the city.
MOVE apparently began to see that by upsetting the neighborhood and
involving the police, it could get public attention for its main issue—
release of its prisoners. Although MOVE seemed to have had little incen-
tive to negotiate with the neighbors at this stage, there is some evidence
they it made at least one agreement.
Composting Agreement
Neighbors approached MOVE about the garbage in their yard. They sug-
gested if MOVE were serious about recycling, then they could do it more
efficiently by composting. That would also meet the neighbors needs by
reducing the odor and vermin food. This example of needs-based bargain-
ing resulted in "wins" for both sides. Although MOVE apparently lived up
to that agreement, the Powelton people interviewed did not remember it.
They were so focused on the life-and-death issues of the massive police
presence, they did not notice an environmental agreement that may have
worked.
Interpol
An example of early mediation intervention was given by Father Paul
Washington, an active black minister. He knew the MOVE leadership and
had helped them visit their incarcerated members. MOVE sympathizers
called him in during Phase II. MOVE was parading on their porch with
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guns, and a tense confrontation with police was in progress. Washington
calmed both sides down and got MOVE to go back into their house to talk.
They were upset because they had heard one of their members, who was
recently arrested, had been beaten by police. Washington shuttled between
MOVE and the police commissioner. He received assurances from the
police that no beating had taken place. He negotiated an agreement that if
the police brought the arrested member to MOVE headquarters to show he
was uninjured, MOVE would relinquish its arms. On his final visit to con-
firm the agreement, Delbert Africa, MOVE'S negotiator, insisted they
would only turn in their guns if their colleagues were released. Washington
concluded that negotiations with MOVE were impossible because they
would keep escalating the stakes.
Delbert Africa, MOVE'S negotiator, in this incident confirmed
Washington's analysis but added a missing piece. He said Washington was
right. MOVE would keep escalating the stakes until someone paid attention
to their basic concern—that is as long as their fundamental issue, freeing
the political prisoners, is being ignored, MOVE would not rest.
Joel Todd
A major intervenor was a young white attorney, Joel Todd. He had rep-
resented Jerry Africa, one of the imprisoned "political prisoners" in his
trial and became friendly with the group. He was well connected with the
city's political structure.
By October of 1977, the Phase II stand-off was four months old. Costs
were mounting for both sides, and MOVE supporters asked Todd to help
them reach a settlement. Todd agreed. His goal was to avoid violence. He
saw the conflict as between MOVE and the city and felt neighborhood was
not a party. He began carrying messages back and forth between the MOVE
headquarters and the city manager's office. He quickly defined each side's
primary issue. MOVE wanted release of its "political prisoners." The city
wanted a face-saving way out of the crisis, preferably by removing MOVE
from the neighborhood.
Todd began to build an agreement with the following terms:
1. MOVE members would submit to orderly arrest procedures concern-
ing the outstanding weapons and riot charges. Procedures would allow wit-
nesses to be present to assure that MOVE members would not be
brutalized, and arrests would be timed so some adult members would
always be in the house to care for the children and animals. Both sides
agreed on these procedures.
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2. Those arrested would be released without posting bail. MOVE wanted
a written guarantee. The city would only give oral assurances.
3. MOVE would permit a weapons search and health inspection of its
premises. Both sides agreed.
4. MOVE would vacate its premises. MOVE disagreed with this.
These provisions were labeled "surrender terms" by the press. They met
the city's basic issue, but the five months of negotiations did not touch
MOVE'S concern about its "political prisoners." While Todd felt MOVE
was so strongly committed to that issue that "they would die for it," he saw
it as an unacceptable demand where no resolution was possible.
This narrow view of what could be negotiated may trace back to Todd's
intervention goal: to avoid violence. A conflict resolution ethical maxim
suggests that when one's sole intervention goal is to avoid violence, one
tends to support the status quo power relationship. That appears to have
taken place here.
Todd defined his intervention style as that of message carrier. He asked
each party what their position was and carried that information to the other
party. He felt it was not appropriate for him to help the parties reality test
their positions or to help them reexamine their needs and those of the other
party in order to invent new solutions. He may have been encouraged in
this approach by MOVE's insistence that "only MOVE negotiates for
MOVE."
MOVE finally broke off negotiations when an imprisoned member was
beaten. The city obtained a court order to evict MOVE by blockading them
and "starving them out." Todd and others obtained a stay, and Todd tried
to arrange a face-to-face negotiation session with MOVE leadership, the
judge, and the city manager. The barricaded MOVE leadership refused to
trust an offer of "safe passage" to the courtroom where the negotiations
were scheduled. Finally, they agreed to let their imprisoned leaders nego-
tiate for the group. That session ended in failure, and the city began the
blockade in earnest. Phase III had begun.
Phase III Interventions
By cordoning off a predominantly black group, cutting off food and
water, and fortifying the police positions, the city made MOVE a cause
celebre, resulting in a flurry of unsuccessful interventions to head off the
clash. Radio personalities were suggested as interveners. Comedian/activist
Dick Gregory met with MOVE once before abandoning his efforts.
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City Wide Coalition
The stage was now set for a more successful intervention. MOVE sup-
porters approached Walt Palmer. Palmer was an established businessman
and civil rights activist with many connections. His goals of intervention
were to avoid violence and to produce a settlement that met the needs of
both parties. He too defined the parties as MOVE and the city. He saw a
major power imbalance. More pressure needed to be applied to get the city
to bargain seriously.
To alter the power relationships, he organized the City Wide Coalition
for Human Rights (CCCHR). CCCHR's religious and business committees
organized those segments of the black community to bring pressure on the
city. The community task force conducted major demonstrations and the
legal task force researched the snarled legal issues. A communications
committee distributed information to the press and defined the situation as
a human rights issue. They even brought the issue before the United
Nations.
Palmer chose Oscar Gaskins, a black civil rights attorney, to negotiate.
Gaskins obtained a power of attorney from MOVE to represent it in nego-
tiations; this gave him credibility as MOVE'S attorney-negotiator.
Impasse Broken
In his negotiations with the city manager's office, Gaskins was the first
intervenor to negotiate MOVE's prisoner issue. City representatives, while
privately agreeing that the charges upon which the prisoners were con-
victed were questionable, felt they could not compromise the legal system
by releasing prisoners under pressure. Gaskins created a solution that met
the interests of both parties. He suggested the prisoners be allowed to
appeal their sentences. The superior court could then release them on their
own recognizance. They were likely to be acquitted on appeal, and if not,
most of their sentence had been served already. Both parties agreed.
Agreement
After breaking this impasse, Gaskins was able to negotiate settlements
on the other issues. The city took the additional step of agreeing to com-
mit themselves in writing to release, without bail, those MOVE members
submitting to arrest. MOVE agreed to allow health and firearm inspections,
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clean the premises, and vacate within 90 days. They also agreed for
Gaskins to represent them in court rather than appear personally, to avoid
confrontations.
Controversy
MOVE complied with much of the agreement. They cleaned the build-
ing and allowed a health inspection, which passed. A firearms inspection
found only inoperative weapons. Controversy arose over the outstanding
charges. MOVE thought they would be dropped. Gaskins felt they would
be routinely processed and MOVE would receive probation. The district
attorney talked about the seriousness of the charges. He started requiring
MOVE members to appear in court which Gaskins and MOVE felt violated
the agreement. The DA changed his mind and felt he was legally bound to
compel MOVE to attend court.
Even more difficult was the requirement for MOVE to relocate within
90 days. Many groups tried to find MOVE rural retreats to practice their
back-to-nature concepts. At one point they were ready to move to a farm
in New Jersey donated by a black farmer.
However, during the 90-day period, MOVE got the impression from a
conversation with the farmer that he wanted to use them for slave labor.
They refused his offer. No one interceded to rectify the problem.
The city took the strict position that MOVE had to be out in 90 days.
MOVE insisted the city should help them find quarters. While private
groups suggested some locations, MOVE found them all lacking. Finally,
the city solicitor was quoted in the newspaper that as soon as the MOVE
premises were vacated the city would bulldoze it. This incensed MOVE
members, who felt they could continue to use their property for other than
residential purposes.
Although Gaskins was available to argue MOVE'S position in court, no
one was available to oversee this growing collection of accusations and
misunderstandings. Finally, at the end of the 90-day period the judge
declared MOVE had broken the agreement. He deputized the police to
forcibly evict MOVE and arrest its members.
After allowing Palmer and a few others to make last minute appeals for
MOVE to surrender, the police moved in. A gunfight broke out in which
one policeman died. Other police and fire-fighters were injured before
MOVE members were finally brought out of the house. One was severely
beaten in front of TV cameras. Newspapers reported that the agreement
failed because MOVE refused to vacate.
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Observations
CCCHR's task was enormous. Many participants sacrificed over six
months of their lives to achieve the agreement. Palmer's activist and street
background gave him credibility and an ability to communicate with
MOVE. He and Gaskins could cajole, confront their positions, and reality
test. They interpreted each party's positions in a way the other could hear.
Their empowerment strategy was effective. The broad community atten-
tion forced the city to bargain more seriously. Its effect may also have gone
the other way, also. The city may have perceived Palmer and Gaskins, with
their community backing, as more able to assure that their clients would
abide by their commitments.
Palmer and Gaskins' indirect "shuttle diplomacy" style made reaching
an agreement easier, since it buffered public officials from MOVE'S out-
bursts. However, when the full agreement is reached through indirect nego-
tiations it may give parties an opportunity to disavow certain provisions.
Jerry Africa, a MOVE'S spokesman, refers to the written agreement as
"Gaskins' agreement" not theirs.
A key element was Gaskins' ability to expand the issue when the par-
ties were deadlocked. He found a solution to the prisoner issue which met
MOVE's goals and maintained the city's concern for the dignity of the law.
He may have been able to interject this solution because he saw his role as
wider than a neutral message bearer. He was an advocate for one party.
Reasons for Failure
The agreement may have failed because one or both sides scuttled it.
Another possibility is that no one was in charge of the implementation
period. Intervenors were too exhausted from the ordeal of reaching agree-
ment to retain vigilance over this key period. In a situation where trust was
so low and verbal dueling so high, postagreement oversight is a crucial issue.
Another problem may have been misperceptions of MOVE's decision-
making structure. Most intervenors, including Palmer and Gaskins, thought
the MOVE spokespeople they worked with either could bind MOVE, or
would have to have the group in the Powelton house ratify the decisions.
Jerry Africa, one of the three "political prisoners," states that MOVE oper-
ated on a consensus process that involved all members—whether present or
not. If he, in prison, disagreed with a commitment made by MOVE nego-
tiators in the house, then the commitment was not binding on any MOVE
member. Whether this interpretation is true is unknown, but it underlines
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the need for intervenors to obtain a clear understanding of the extent to
which negotiators can bind their group.
The failure to involve all parties was also crucial. Since the neighbor-
hood was not included in the negotiation, the city ended up adopting the
most extreme neighborhood position—removing MOVE. That became a
fixed position. The neighborhood's absence prevented the parties from con-
sidering a more moderate approach, such as MOVE remaining while com-
plying with health codes and basic standards of courtesy.
The police were left out. Their ongoing clashes with MOVE set up a
dynamic similar to two warring gangs. After each rumble, one gang wants
to avenge the wrongs from the last clash. Ultimately, police harbored
resentment from the death of one of their members in the shoot-out.
Nothing in the agreement or the aftermath was designed to defuse their
hostility. Untreated police resentment may have contributed to the violence
in 1985.
While MOVE and CCCHR viewed MOVE as a political organization,
the city responded with traditional law enforcement tactics. Unlike a crim-
inal group which might respond to punishment and deterrence, a group that
sees itself as a revolutionary political movement might even be strength-
ened, attract more publicity, and galvanize support from confrontation and
challenge. The presence of the media made it difficult for the city to meet
MOVE'S demands without losing face, even though privately they may
have seen merit in MOVE'S position.
Differing styles of expressing conflict may have been a factor. MOVE'S
rhetoric was laden with violent threats to neighbors, public officials, and
all who opposed them. One never knew to what extent the threats were
real. Some suggest the line between "talking" and "fighting" is different
between street-black and middle class black and white culture. To the mid-
dle class angry words, heat, confrontation, insults and threats will inex-
orably lead to violence. In street black culture, however, there is a clear
separation. "Talking" is verbal: "fighting" is physical. A "fight" begins
when someone within the context of an angry quarrel begins to make a
provocative move. MOVE talked but did not physically provoke con-
frontation.
1978-1982
Ten MOVE members were convicted on conspiracy counts related to the
police officer who was killed in the shoot-out. Charges were dropped against
the officers who beat the captured MOVE leader. Once again, freeing
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prisoners became MOVE'S main articulated issue. MOVE dispersed to
other cities. Mayor Rizzo was succeeded by a moderate who in turn was
succeeded by Philadelphia's first black mayor, Wilson Goode.
Many MOVE members left Philadelphia and established settlements in
New York and Virginia. In the early 1980s the city, processing outstanding
warrants, extradited MOVE members back to Philadelphia. A group settled
on Osage Avenue in a house owned by John Africa's sister. During this
period MOVE spokesperson Jerry Africa pressed MOVE'S position with
anyone in authority he could reach. MOVE insisted it was subject to con-
sistent abuse of the legal process; it was being persecuted and imprisoned
for its belief rather than actions.
Once again, a lifestyle conflict arose in the new Osage Avenue neigh-
borhood. Problems such as sanitation, collecting animals, and cutting flea
collars off neighbors' pets created friction. By October 1983, verbal harass-
ment was added to the list.
The new neighborhood was black, middle class. It was the heart of the
political coalition that had elected Mayor Goode and trusted him to find a
solution to the MOVE problem.
Memories of 1978
All parties involved seemed to operate on assumptions about the others
they had "learned" in 1978. The city, and many potential intervenors,
thought they had learned:
1. MOVE is an untrustworthy bargainer,
2. MOVE will violate any agreement,
3. MOVE is more interested in confrontation than settlement,
4. Therefore, it is unproductive to negotiate with MOVE.
MOVE thought it had learned:
1. The city is an untrustworthy bargainer,
2. The city will violate any agreement,
3. The city is more interested in destroying MOVE than settlement.
4. Therefore, if it is possible to negotiate with the city at all, it is only
when it is subject to broad pressure from an aroused public.
Building Crisis on Osage Avenue
When Jerry Africa's negotiations led nowhere, MOVE began trying to
call attention to their cause using the same techniques that had succeeded
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in 1978. They barricaded their house, mounted loud-speakers in front, and
began harassing the neighborhood.
Neighbors appealed to the city for help, and the city took a wait-and-see
attitude. No broad-based coalition to support a negotiation process arose.
Generally, Philadelphians trusted the new liberal black administration to
find a reasonable solution to the problem.
Most people saw the issue of freeing ten people convicted of killing a
police officer to be an unreasonable demand. Some intervenors unsuccess-
fully involved in the 1978 event advised the mayor that negotiation was
impossible. However, Bennie Swans of the Crisis Intervention Network,
planned a promising approach. His agency had good street contacts with
MOVE. He felt that MOVE was really after an orderly process by which
each of the ten cases could be reviewed. He envisioned persuading MOVE
to change its political tactics. Rather than provoke the neighbors, it might
try to form coalitions with them. An initial bargaining point might be for
MOVE to forgo disturbing people with their loud-speakers if the neighbors
would join them in protesting the imprisonment issue.
Since the Crisis Intervention Network was city funded, Swans sought
clearance from the city manager's office to pursue negotiations. He was
turned away, as were others who tried to intervene. The city had already
decided MOVE was a police matter. Even if the broad decision to negoti-
ate had not already been made, Swans' plan probably would have met with
city resistance. It amounted to building a political coalition directed at
changing city policy. That strategy might have jeopardized the agency's
city funding.
There were a few other attempts to intervene. MOVE participated in all,
but none of the third parties could enlist the city in dialogue.
MOVE continued its harassment, and the neighbors grew more resent-
ful. When they finally appealed for help from the state and threatened
physical retaliation, the city's conflict avoidance policy became unwork-
able. They had to do some thing quick and dramatic. They evacuated the
neighborhood and began the assault. Once again last-minute attempts were
made to defuse the crisis. MOVE received the delegations. The city did not
and went ahead with the armed assault.
A partial explanation of the severity of the police assault may be the
unresolved hostilities between MOVE and the police dating back to the
1978 period. Police were not a party to that agreement, and no follow-up
work was done to defuse those tensions.
An investigative commission issued a report condemning the assault as
being excessively violent and bungled. A local grand jury was formed and
issued no indictments against any public officials. Mayor Goode was
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reelected to serve a second term. Meanwhile, Ramona Africa, sole survivor
of the Osage bombing, was convicted and served time in the state peniten-
tiary on riot related charges.
MOVE still exists in Philadelphia. While John Africa died in the
inferno, some coherency still exists in the group. Its grievances are still the
same—freedom for its "unjustly imprisoned" members. Now the stakes are
higher. The history of clashes that result in violence, followed by punish-
ment of MOVE members and exoneration of city officials is an even greater
barrier to building the trust needed for a settlement.
